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Companies undertaking initial public offerings (IPOs) in Greece were obliged to include next-
year profit forecast in their prospectuses until the regulation changed in 2001 to voluntary. 
Drawing evidence from IPOs issued during 1993–2015, we produce the first study to investigate 
the effect of disclosure regime on management earnings forecasts and IPO long-term 
performance. The findings indicate lower management forecast accuracy and higher long-term 
returns during the mandatory period, suggesting that the mandatory disclosure requirement 
causes issuers to systematically bias profit forecasts downwards opting for the safety of 
accounting conservatism. The mandatory disclosure requirement artificially improves IPO share 
performance. Overall, our results show that disclosure can actually impede capital market 
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1. Introduction  
 
An initial public offering (IPO) brings a firm’s shares to the public for the first time and it 
anticipates mass participation during the subscription period. Public interest is highly dependent 
on the evaluation of available information from the newly issued prospectus, since this 
information is often the first window on the firm’s past and its projected future performance. 
Few investors have the luxury of time to read the entirety of this official document whereas the 
others prefer to focus on key points disclosed in the prospectus. One figure that attracts special 
attention is the management earnings forecast.1 Investors assess the accuracy of the earnings 
forecasts, as they can serve as a performance indicator of the newly-listed firm. 
 
Accuracy in future earnings forecasts is difficult to achieve, as there are many 
unpredictable events that can take place between the forecast day and the day of the official 
announcement of actual earnings. Such events can include market instability, unforeseen 
political incidents, exchange rate fluctuations, liquidity problems, and misunderstanding of 
market trends. Despite efforts by senior management of many newly-listed IPOs to provide 
accurate earnings forecasts, few firms have succeeded. Many firms end up with a large 
difference between forecast and actual results. The forecast error is dualistic in nature. It can be 
optimistic if the earnings forecast in the prospectus is superior to the actual earnings presented in 
the first company annual report, or pessimistic if the earnings forecast appears to be less than the 
actual earnings. This difference in earnings may lead to entirely different implications in the long 
term; this is one of the issues to be explored in this study. 
 
Motivated by the importance of earnings forecasts and their tendency to signal future 
performance, the aim of this study is to assess the usefulness of management earnings forecast 
disclosure to investors. Previous literature has concentrated on the impact of various accounting 
decisions on long-term returns (Mitchell and Stafford (2000); Yi (2001)).  For example, literature 
on public equity offerings has focused on the effect of discretionary accruals on the long-run 
performance of these offerings (Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a). In a related study, Chou et 
al. (2010) show how earnings management practices affect private placements of equity. Profit 
                                                 
1International evidence covering management earnings forecast around IPOs includes Lee et al. (1993) and Hartnett and 
Romcke (2000) for Australia; Li and McConomy (2004) for Canada; Chen and Firth (1999) for China; Cormier and 
Martinez (2006) for France; Gounopoulos et al. (2015) for Greece; Jaggi (1997), Cheng and Firth (2000), and Chen et al. (2001) 
for Hong Kong; Jelic et al. (2001) for Malaysia; Firth and Smith (1992) for New Zealand; Firth et al. (1995) for Singapore; Firth 
and Lonkani (2005) for Thailand; Jelic (2011) for the UK; and Drobetz et al. (2015) for the maritime industry. 
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forecasts may include unwarranted optimism when managers exercise their discretion in an 
abusive way. (as in Jaggi et al. (2006). Additional research has drawn the link between earnings 
forecast direction (i.e. positive or negative compared to actual earnings) and a number of post-
IPO dimensions such as the evolution of the organizational character and changes in competitive 
strategy (e.g., Bhabra (2003)).  
 
This paper builds on the management earnings forecast literature in that it analyzes the 
effect that an exogenous change in IPO disclosure can have on the reliability of available 
information and investor behavior. Motivated by the large market reliance on initial forecasts 
during IPOs (Dechow et al.,  (2000)), we investigate the use of this mechanism that is supposed 
to cause less friction in an IPO sale and to facilitate the efficient allocation of capital. Basic 
questions that this paper addresses are: Can profit forecasts provided in IPO prospectuses 
constitute an important determinant of future market performance? Does a flexible disclosure 
status brought about by regulatory change (mandatory to voluntary) contribute to increased 
forecast accuracy? Under a voluntary regime, how do IPO firms that do not provide earnings 
forecast perform? Do investors penalize inaccurate forecasts by IPO firms with strong negative 
returns or does their reaction opportunistically depend on the direction of the observed error? 
 
This paper differs from the existing literature on the effect of earnings forecasts on IPO 
performance in several ways. First, it focuses on management errors by contrasting forecast 
earnings in the prospectus with actual earnings as reported in the first annual report. The 
difference between the two figures constitutes forecast error; this is the central point of this 
study. The previous studies do not explore this error, but compare earnings published before 
going public with earnings presented in annual reports up to three years after going public. 
However, the magnitude and sign of management forecast errors are valuable information. If the 
initial forecast is optimistic, realized earnings will come as a disappointment to investors and the 
market will correct earlier overvaluations (hence, lower long-run performance). Inversely, 
pessimistic forecasts should pave the way for higher returns subsequent to future reporting 
periods. 
 
Second, this study analyzes management earnings forecasts under two different 
regulatory regimes (mandatory and voluntary) within the same market, i.e., Greece. This gives us 
the opportunity to conduct an experiment providing direct comparison between two samples, one 
in which management is obliged to provide earnings forecasts in the prospectus (mandatory 
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disclosure), and a second in which management has the choice of providing earnings forecasts 
(voluntary disclosure). The results shed light on which disclosure mechanism better serves the 
interests of investors, and will assist regulators in formulating decisions that are aligned with a 
well-functioning capital market. 
 
The empirical evidence indicates that three-year returns (starting with the end of the first 
day of trading) become significantly more negative in the voluntary period compared to the 
mandatory disclosure period. By and large, IPOs that do not disclose earnings forecasts 
experience considerably inferior long-term returns. Market conditions surrounding an IPO also 
prove to be an important determinant of the long-term performance trends, since firms going 
public during a cold period experience better long-term returns.2 Moreover, IPO firms with high 
positive forecast errors (i.e. actual profits exceeding forecast profits) are associated with better 
returns. In sum, the evidence attests to the existence of considerable accounting conservatism 
during the mandatory period as a form of insurance from the issuers’ side.  
 
Overall, the findings have important policy implications, since this is, to the best of our 
knowledge, the first study to analyze the effect of transitioning to a voluntary disclosure status on 
earnings forecast accuracy. The regime change provides an opportunity for policy makers to 
observe the reaction of the market and for researchers to explore whether firms signal their 
quality through earnings forecasts. In addition, the findings have major implications on how 
financial markets create managerial incentives in order to reduce forecast errors and to avoid 
costs associated with potential legal actions by shareholders when reported earnings diverge 
considerably from forecasted earnings (e.g., Skinner 1994 ; Frankel et al. 1995; Teoh, Welch and 
Rao., 1998;  Frankel et al. 2002 ; Baginski et al. 2002; Karamanou and Vafeas 2005; Jaggi et al. 
2006). In parallel, we document how a country (i.e., Greece) implements controls aimed at 
reducing information asymmetry among market players, strengthening the rule of law, and 
improving the effectiveness of governmental authorities to reduce IPO firms’ earnings forecast 
errors. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review 
and develops the research hypotheses. Section 3 overviews the institutional background.   
Section 4 describes the data and presents the methodology. Section 5 presents the descriptive 
                                                 
2 We follow Ritter's (1984) who considers cold periods as those with low average initial return. 
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statistics and interprets the empirical results. We test the robustness of our results in Section 6. 
Section 7 sets forth the conclusions. 
 
2. Related literature review  
2.1. Theoretical framework 
 
Numerous studies examine post-issue market performance of IPOs (e.g., Ritter (1991); 
Chen et al. (2000); Dimovski and Brooks (2004)). Gajewski and Gresse (2006), in their survey of 
European IPO markets, report significant underperformance of newly-listed firms at the 3-year 
horizon in all countries, except Greece and Portugal. Thomadakis et al. (2012) confirm earlier 
results by reporting that the Greek case differs from international evidence. The authors reveal 
that long-term outperformance continues for a long period after listing. The unique case of Greek 
IPOs represents an interesting setting to explore it in more depth and in light of management 
earnings forecasts.  
 
Theories such as window-dressing, market timing,3 market optimism,4 price support,5 and 
investor sentiment explain long-term underperformance of firms going public. Some of these 
theories, like window-dressing and investor sentiment, may explain both IPO long-run 
underperformance and management earnings forecasts. According to Teoh, Welch and 
Wong (1998a), the window dressing theory supports the view that managers are ready to 
manipulate reported earnings around IPOs to give the stock market a false signal on the future 
profitability of the candidate firm, and thus reduce the cost of capital. The authors observe that 
the more earnings management there is around IPOs, the more stock price performance decreases 
after three years.6 Investor sentiment theories focus on the impact of “irrational” or “sentiment” 
investors on stock prices. In the case of IPOs, this potential impact appears strong because IPO 
                                                 
3 According to the market timing hypothesis, managers choose a window of opportunity to launch an IPO. This window is 
identified as a function of the firm’s performance and market conditions. Generally, managers prefer to take their firms 
public when they have well performed, and probably the IPO date is conditional on the firm’s cycle of activity and 
operational performance. Further, the window of opportunity for an IPO may be determined by market conditions. In a 
bullish market, the number of IPOs tends to increase because the placement of stocks is easier, the risk of failure of an IPO 
is lower, and securities are priced higher. 
4 Market optimism theory states that active “buy and sell trades” in the aftermarket during the first day of trading, so-
called “flipping activity” is a good indication of future stock price performance. The theory suggests that there are periods 
when investors are particularly confident about firms’ future projects and profits, and that managers are induced to make 
offerings in these periods. 
5 The price support hypothesis indicates that underwriters stabilize stock prices during a short period of time after the IPO 
so as to avoid failure of the issue. Prices are artificially supported at a high level in the short-run, but at the end of the 
stabilization period, performance decreases. 
6 This hypothesis assumes that investors are not able to correctly estimate firm value at the time of the offering. After a 
three-year period, investors would be able to identify the accounting adjustments and would reallocate their portfolios. 
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firms are more likely to suffer from information opacity and hence more difficult to value 
(Ljungqvist (2007). Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh (2006) model an IPO company’s response to 
the presence of sentiment investors. They assume that some sentiment investors are optimistic on 
the future prospects of the IPO firm. The objective of the issuer is to capture a bigger portion of 
the “surplus” attributable to the presence of sentiment investors resulting in the offer price 
maximization relative to the intrinsic value of the stock. Nevertheless, regulatory restrictions 
provide low level of flexibility to the issuers. 
 
2.2. The literature on management earnings forecasts and long-run 
performance 
 
Management earnings forecasts have received much research attention, because under 
specific circumstances, this information can signal the direction of long-term performance of 
IPOs. There are a number of studies that shed light on the inefficiencies in the IPO market. For 
instance, Hughes (1986) and Guo (2005) highlight the importance of the information asymmetry 
between investors and the issuer of an IPO.7 Li and McConomy (2004) show that retained 
ownership and management earnings forecasts are credible, value-relevant signals. Though, in an 
essential difference from the Greek IPO market, forecasts in Canada have never acquired a 
compulsory nature. Jelic et al. (2001) are the first to explore the link between management 
forecast errors and long-term performance of IPOs. Their results suggest positive and statistically 
significant long-term returns up to three years after listing, which contradicts the consensus of 
the IPO literature for a significant negative long-term performance. Further, their evidence shows 
a negative association between upward bias in management earnings forecasts and IPO 
performance in the first 12 months following the IPO. Because the requirement for disclosure 
has always been in effect in the capital market under study (Malaysia), the authors’ focus is 
naturally confined to the dichotomy between optimistic and conservative forecasts rather than 
forecasts versus no forecasts at all. Bhabra and Pettway (2003), in line with Platt (1995), Hensler 
et al. (1997) and Jain and Kini (2000), attempt to explain the usefulness of IPO prospectus data 
to potential investors. Their results indicate that prospectus information remains useful in the 
aftermarket over the short window of one year, although the value of this information declines 
rapidly with time. Notably, while the prospectus clues that the researchers consider comprise a 
variety of firm and IPO specific features, any management projections or forward-looking 
                                                 
7 Hughes (1986) highlights that, to avoid market failure, the issuer should make a disclosure about firm value that could be 
verified by the investment bank. 
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information is discarded. From a different point of view, Bhabra and Pettway (2003) uphold that 
the reason for the lack of underperformance in the first year is the price support provided by 
underwriters in the immediate aftermarket leaving no room for behavioral interpretations 
Jaggi et al. (2006) show that mandatory disclosure of earnings forecasts in Taiwanese 
IPOs results in more optimistic forecasts than pessimistic forecasts, especially for firms 
expecting better performance in the forecast year compared to the previous year. In spite of the 
rich cross-sectional analysis of the mandatory period, the study suffers from the lack of 
comparative evidence from the period prior to the regulation. Overall, the findings from 
Malaysia (Jelic et al. (1998)) and Singapore (Firth et al. (1995)) suggest that managers tend to be 
pessimistic forecasters, whereas findings from Canada (Pedwell et al. (1994)), New Zealand 
(Mak (1989), and Firth and Smith (1992)), and Australia (Lee et al. (1993b) and Firth et 
al. (2012)) suggest that managers tend to overestimate future earnings in their forecasts. 
Evidence for Hong Kong is inconclusive. Selva et al. (1994) report optimistic forecasts while 
Chan et al. (1996) report that management forecasts are conservative and pessimistic.  
More recently, Gong et al. (2009) find a positive association between management 
earnings forecasts and long-term performance for US IPO firms, which is stronger for firms 
operating in a more uncertain business environment. The authors identify the causes of the 
uncertainty in the duration of a firm’s operating cycle as well as in the volatility of turnover 
growth and operating cash flow.  These findings motivate us to expand further the uncertainty 
setting to encompass the firm’s management, internal processes and overall quality. Firms 
transitioning from the private to public domain are opportune for this purpose because of their 
lack of a prior reporting history. In conjunction with the regulatory change that took place in the 
beginning of the 2000s, a unique setting emerges in order to examine the link between 
management earnings forecasts and long-term performance of IPO firms. 
2.3 Hypotheses development 
 
Greece has been the first country in the world to experience regulatory alteration as its 
mandatory regime was replaced by a voluntary one.8 These two disclosure regimes embody 
entirely different philosophies and follow distinct principles, which affect the behavior of 
                                                 
8 The regulatory switch from mandatory to voluntary management earnings forecasts was motivated by its expected 
contribution to the efficient and cost-effective functioning of the capital markets. The protection of investors and the 
maintenance of confidence in the Greek financial market were also important issues. This regulatory change was also 
intended to reinforce the freedom of movement of capital within the Greek market and to help small family companies to 
go public. The change involved the forecast for the next year end. 
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management during the decision making process. The whole framework offers a unique 
opportunity to explore the level of earnings forecasts prior to and after the regulatory change. 
 
 Prior literature documents a mandatory disclosure environment for earnings forecasts in 
Singapore, Malaysia, and New Zealand, and a voluntary one in other Commonwealth countries 
(Firth and Smith (1992), Firth et al. (1995), Hartnett and Romcke (2000), Chen et al. (2001), Li 
and McConomy (2004), Jelic (2011)). The results on earnings forecast reveal low levels of error 
in countries with voluntary disclosure (Australia: 34.49%, Hong Kong: 12.79%, UK: 11%) 
compared with countries disclosing mandatory earnings forecasts (Malaysia: 54.1% and New 
Zealand: 111%). This initial observation provides a first indication that moving from a 
mandatory disclosure environment to a voluntary one would improve the accuracy of earnings 
forecast.       
 
Hutton et al. (2003) document that good news forecasts are informative only when they 
come along with verifiable forward-looking information that improves their credibility, whereas 
bad news earnings forecasts are always informative. Ηuang et al. (2014) examine the efficacy of 
a forecast regulation in China and report that voluntary forecasts are timelier and more precise 
than mandatory forecasts, suggesting that voluntary forecasts are of higher quality than 
mandatory forecasts. In the same vein, Horton et al. (2013) report that the quality of the 
information environment –proxied by forecast accuracy– has significantly increased following 
the mandatory IFRS adoption. 
 
 In addition to the important international evidence in support of a voluntary regime, the 
environment of acute uncertainty characterizing an IPO sale incentivizes the management to act 
in ways that insulate itself from any negative implications (e.g., reputational damage or litigation 
costs) in the post-IPO period. Consequently, if all issuers are required to disclose a forecast, then 
the average forecast is likely to be pessimistic reflecting the general conservatism in estimates. 
On the basis of these arguments, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
 H1: Regulatory change from mandatory to voluntary earnings forecasts increases the accuracy 
of IPO earnings forecasts. 
Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) argue that companies prefer to go public after unusually 
high earnings performance. They contend that superior earnings reduce the risk faced by 
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investors and secure wide participation (see also, Brav and Gompers (1997)). Clearly, however, 
not all issuers are capable of deferring an IPO until their accounting bottom line is deemed 
satisfactory. For example, smaller firms or those belonging to technology industries condition 
their profitability on the proceeds to be raised so that positive earnings follow a successful listing 
and not the other way around. Forecasts of next year’s profits could be important in these 
situations. Degeorge and Derrien (2001a) examine earnings forecasts published in IPO 
prospectuses and report that the forecast error is the main driver of IPOs stock price performance 
as it embodies investors’ expectations at the time of the IPO. Gounopoulos et al. (2015) 
document that IPO firms with accurate forecasts experience lower levels of underpricing than 
those that are unable to provide accurate earnings forecasts. However, forecasts can hardly 
represent a holistic response to the problem of ex-ante uncertainty given that the forecast horizon 
is confined to the next year’s profits. In fact, in the eyes of investors, the IPO firms are likely to 
remain question marks until a sequence of future reporting periods. Consequently, the resolution 
of uncertainty should more apparently reflect on long-term rather than first-day or other short-
term returns. 
Our focus during the post-issue period is also on firms that include a forecast in their 
prospectus and fail to meet earnings expectations. Such firms, by intentionally inflating their 
earnings forecasts, may be able to obtain a higher share price on the IPO date. If there were no 
subsequent costs to managers of such firms, more firms would prefer to issue optimistic earnings 
forecasts. However, taking into account the risk of subsequent legal implications, the incentives 
for accounting conservatism through the production of pessimistic forecasts are substantial. In 
addition, forecasters that do not meet earnings expectations pay a price in the form of 
significantly lower post-issue performance than forecasters that meet their earnings forecasts 
(Jog and McConomy (2003)). This line of reasoning leads to the following testable hypothesis: 
 
H2: IPO firms that provide pessimistic earnings forecasts (or mandatory earnings forecasts) 
exhibit significantly higher post-issue long term performance. 
 
 
 3. Institutional background 




By 2000, Greece appeared on track to qualify for the first Eurozone enlargement and join 
the pioneer 11 Member States which had already replaced their national currencies with the 
Euro. Key to this endeavor has been the meticulous work of the Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission to identify possibilities for convergence with the institutional and regulatory 
framework of the other European partners. In the market for new equities, a large portion of 
friction was attributable to a regulation forcing issuers to forecast profitability and disclose 
estimates on the IPO prospectus. A requirement causing a lot of discontent among prospective 
IPOs due to the significant compliance costs as well as the dearth of operational experience 
which often constituted projections highly precarious. 
 
The subsequent switch to a voluntary disclosure environment came as a long-anticipated 
remedy to the above concerns. Given the limited depth of the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) in 
terms of member companies and trading volumes, this regulatory flexibility was implemented in 
order to foster participation by eliminating some of the listing barriers. It was also intended to 
convey in an unambiguous manner the political will to implement structural reforms in the 
interest of market efficiency and harmonization. 
 
In line with the economic and political objectives, the transition from mandatory to 
voluntary disclosure of management earnings forecasts marked a stepping stone towards the 
adoption of the more comprehensive International Accounting Standards (IAS). IAS assess any 
regulation on the basis of three criteria: first, that it fulfills the essential requirements imposed by 
the Council Directives (i.e. the implementation of the regulation is conducive to a fair and 
accurate representation of a firm’s financial standing and performance); second, that, in the spirit 
of the 17 July 2000 Council decisions, it advances the European public interest; and third, that it 
adheres to quality standards that constitute financial statement information both relevant and 
functional to end users. The maintenance of the status quo, that is the systematic production of 
biased earnings forecasts under a mandatory regime, would plausibly alienate the Greek capital 
market from the IAS philosophy and principles. And this was a discrepancy that Greek 
authorities were quick to realize. 
3.2. Development of the IPO market in Greece 
 
The IPO market in Greece has experienced three historical periods of major development. 
The first is the period 1925–1926 with 9 IPOs, the second includes 1972–1974 with 32 IPOs, and 
the third is the period 1995–2001 with 208 IPOs. Each of those periods has unique characteristics 
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and is associated with growth in the Greek economy. Specifically, Thomadakis et al. (2015b) 
show that after 1924 and until 1940, the Athens Stock Exchange experienced a boom and an 
unprecedented record in new listings. In total, 71 companies were admitted to trading in this 
period,9 as a result of the increasing public spending (including foreign aid) on refugee assistance 
from Asia Minor, which created large domestic demand for food, clothing, and housing. The 
pace of growth picked up; 1924–28 was a distinct period of rapid economic development in 
Modern Greek history. Inflation was also high, but was on the whole much lower than the 
preceding decade, averaging an annual rate of 13% in the period 1924–27. 
 
The second IPO wave was a direct result of the bourgeonic development of the Greek 
economy during the 1972–1974 period. This was an era of GNP growth at an average annual rate 
of 6.2% within an environment of monetary stability, while maintaining improved national 
production, employment, and exports, whose composition shifted to manufacturing, brought 
major increases in financial saving, and low inflation. This period of prosperity was interrupted 
by the first energy crisis and the simultaneous political (and geopolitical) crisis of Cyprus in 
1974. 
 
The third period is the most prominent and played a critical role in the rapid growth of 
the IPO market in Greece. In particular, 1997 was a very significant year, a “landmark” in the 
history of the Greek economy and in the history of the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). In the 
1997–1999 period, the ASE witnessed its greatest phase of growth. Overall, the period 1993-
2001 was characterized by readjustment of macroeconomic indicators, with the main goal being 
the maintenance of the inflation rate to under 3% and reduction of the fiscal deficit. By the end 
of 2000, the Greek economy had transformed into a "modern" economy, with an updated 
structure and strong dynamism. Healthy conditions were present in the economy in the 1997-
1999 period, as economic growth, monetary stability, investment in infrastructure, growth in 
exports, and reform of the business sector motivated many companies to seek higher growth 
rates through IPOs. As a result, a record of 31.68 billion Euros were raised through new public 
offerings. 
 
                                                 
9 Among the 71 listings, the most prominent were banking firms with 15 listings, textiles with 12, construction with 8, 
chemicals and food, each with 7 new listings. 
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4. Data and methodology  
4.1. Sample 
 
The sample covers the period January 1993 to December 2015 and consists of 303 Greek 
IPOs. Companies that operate as closed-end funds are excluded from the sample because they 
are subject to different regulations and present unique characteristics. A large effort was made to 
collect the data for all remaining firms listed on the ASE. Towards that end, a variety of sources 
were used to gather the needed information including Compustat, Datastream, and Thomson 
Financial Securities Data Corporation (SDC). To be included in the sample, a firm must have a 
prospectus with required financial statements of at least one year prior to going public, data on 
earnings forecasts, and stock prices for at least 36 months (or 756 trading days) following the 
IPO. 
Forecast earnings for one year after going public are manually retrieved from the IPO 
prospectuses and crosschecked with the official statistical “Bulletin of the ASE”. Actual earnings 
for years t+1, t+2, and t+3 are collected from the respective annual reports and crosschecked 
with data provided by the Capital Market Commission. In cases of divergence, we rely on the 
information given by the supervisory authorities (i.e. ASE and Capital Market Commission). 
Market returns and stock prices are collected from Datastream, while ASEGI (ASE General 
Index) is retrieved from the ASE database. Necessary adjustments are made for dividends and 
stock splits. Financial data are derived from published financial statements at the end of fiscal 





 The forecast error measure is the difference between the actual and predicted earnings for 
a given period. It can be calculated with (Forecast Error (FE)) or without (Absolute Forecast 
Error (AFE)) the error sign. Jaggi (1997), Cheng and Firth (2000), and Chen et al. (2001), 
among other, consider that the signed FE captures the bias in the forecast, as it indicates whether 
the manager has been optimistic or pessimistic in their forecast. Prior literature addresses this 
issue and partially explains why earnings forecasts are generally overoptimistic. A positive value 
for the signed FE implies that, on average, IPO firms have a pessimistic bias, while a negative 




 The management forecast error for an IPO firm is calculated as 
 
itititit FPFPAPFE /)(                                                     (1) 
 
where FEit, is the forecast error for company i at date t; APit stands for actual profit, and FPit is 
the forecast profit. 
The average forecast error using the signed FE measure does not give credible 
information on the average size of the error since positive and negative errors cancel each other 
out. The AFE is, therefore, a more appropriate measure of the accuracy of forecasts. The AFE 
represents the magnitude of the error while the average FE (inclusive of sign) measures the bias 
in forecasts. The AFE provides an indication of how close forecasts are to actual profits in 
absolute terms. The AFE is measured as follows: 
 
                                                  AFEit=│(APit-FPit)│/│FPit│                                                   (2) 
 
where AFE is absolute forecast error.  
 
We consider two measures of long-run stock performance namely cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) from the end of the first day of trading until the earlier of the stock’s delisting date 
or its third anniversary, and buy-and-hold returns (BHR) starting four months after the first fiscal 
year-end, to allow for reporting lag. The former measure follows the method of Ritter (1991) and 
the latter that of Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998b). We use the general market index to adjust 
stock returns on a monthly basis. Monthly market-adjusted returns are calculated as monthly raw 
returns on a stock over the monthly market return for the corresponding period. The market 
adjusted return for stock i in month t is given as 
 
Adjusted Returnit  (ARit) = Raw Returnit (Rit) – Market Returnit (Rmt)              (3) 
 
The average adjusted return on a portfolio of n stocks for event month t is the equally weighted 
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The cumulative market-adjusted aftermarket return (CAR) from event month q to event month s 
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Fama and French (1993)10 show that when the standard three-factor model (without the 
momentum factor) is estimated in randomly chosen sample firms with small size and low book-
to-market ratio, the null hypothesis of zero abnormal performance is over-rejected. The majority 
of our sample consists of small and growth firms, thus this potential problem can be particularly 
severe. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) also raise the possibility that the intercept under the null 
hypothesis may be biased under the standard calendar-time approach. To solve this problem, we 
follow Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Brav and Gompers (1997) and construct a zero-
investment calendar-time portfolio consisting of long positions on firms that change their trading 
locations, and short positions on matched control firms that do not change locations. This 
approach mainly involves calculating average returns or rolling calendar-time of stocks. We 
examine the performance of these monthly portfolios by calculating the subsequent excess return 
and running the following calendar-time regression. Under this model, abnormal returns are 
calculated as follows:  
 
Fama and French (1993) value-weighted three-factor model (FF3F) 
 
( ) ( )pt ft mt ft t t ptR R a R R SMB HML                                                   (6) 
 
where Rpt is the calendar time portfolio return, Rft is the one-month T-bill yield during month t, 
Rmt is the value-weighted market index return, SMBt is the difference in returns of value-
weighted portfolios of small firms and large firms during month t, HMLt is the return differential 
of value-weighted portfolios of high and low book-to-market firms in month t, β, γ and δ are 
regression parameters specific to the portfolio, and εpt is the error term. We construct the SMB 
and HML factors as in Fama and French (1993). 
 
 
4.3 Additional factors determining the accuracy of management earnings 
forecasts  
 
                                                 
10 Fama and French (1996) find that many efficient market “anomalies” can be explained by taking into account size and 
book-to-market effects through the use of a three factor benchmark. 
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There has been some evidence on factors affecting the quality of earnings forecasts; 
however there is so far no study that associates this observed accuracy with the long-term 
performance of IPO firms. Addressing this gap, we identify a number of IPO and firm-specific 
variables that can plausibly offer incremental explanatory power to the reliability of managerial 
predictions. 
 
Size: Size, commonly proxied by market capitalization, has been extensively used in a long-run 
context as it is a factor of the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. In terms of earnings 
forecast, it has been argued that large companies are able to use the best expertise and modern 
sophisticated forecasting techniques to attain more accuracy (e.g. Eddy and Seifert (1992); Firth 
and Smith (1992); Mak (1994)). Some authors have also argued that large companies might even 
have greater control over their market settings and they might have gained comparative 
economies of scale making them less susceptible to economic fluctuations (e.g. Firth, et 
al. (1995)). Taken together, these arguments converge to the direction of enhanced accuracy for 
larger corporate issuers. 
 
Age: The operating history of a firm prior to going public plays a significant role in its long-run 
stock price performance and in the accuracy of its forecasts. Firm age has been suggested as a 
proxy for the risk level of the IPO firm (Ritter (1984), Carter et al. (1998), and Khurshed et 
al. (2006)). Firms with a long history are shown to provide more detailed management earnings 
forecast disclosure and more accurate forecasts about their future performance, as they are likely 
to have better control over their operations and a better feeling for the market environment (e.g., 
Firth and Smith (1992) and Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean (2007)). This is expected to affect their 
future performance and to offer better returns to their long-term investors. Age is measured as the 
number of years starting from the year of establishment until the year of going public. 
 
Timelag: Time lag is the number of days from prospectus registration to listing date. In many 
countries, time lag is short; however, it generally ranges from 5 to 70 days. During this period, 
changes in market conditions may affect the price performance of IPO firms, as well as 
aftermarket returns. Many studies (e.g., Lee et al. (1993a), Firth, et al. (1995), Jelic et al. (1998), 
Hartnett and Romcke (2000), Lonkhani and Firth (2005)) support the notion that the length of the 
forecasting period influences the degree of forecast accuracy. Forecasts with a shorter time 
horizon are expected to be more accurate and to have better long term performance, while those 
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with longer time horizons are associated with greater uncertainty and less satisfactory returns in 
the long term (Jaggi (1997). 
 
Privatization: Megginson et al. (2000) examine long-run aftermarket performance for a 36-
country sample of 264 privatization IPOs during 1981–1997 and show a positive performance 
irrespective of the considered period (one, three, and five years). Brav and Gompers (1997) show 
empirically decreasing long-term underperformance of privatized IPO firms. It is expected that 
these firms are publicly recognizable and that any government, as the principal shareholder, 
would like to see a successful issue and, at the same time, secure positive feedback from the 
markets and the media. Because of the expected high public participation, management makes an 
effort to provide an accurate earnings forecast, which enhances the reputation of the firm and 
helps secure good long-term returns. We include in the model a dummy variable, Privatization, 
which is set to one if the firm is a privatized entity, and zero otherwise. 
 
Oversubscription: The degree of forecast accuracy is likely to decrease with the level of 
oversubscription. It is expected that uninformed investors create high demand for highly 
underpriced, low-quality IPOs associated with high forecast error. These IPOs become part of 
the speculative attitude by well informed investors in the aftermarket and experience amplified 
flipping activity. This behavior is well explained by the speculative bubble hypothesis, which is 
an alternative approach toward explaining the post-listing return behavior of IPO firms. When 
investors do not behave rationally, they may over- or under-react to information about IPO 
prospects and they may temporarily over- or undervalue the price of the initial offerings. As a 
result, investor demand will be high in the short-run, leading to poor long-term performance. 
 
Underwriter reputation:11 Most theoretical studies regarding long-term performance of IPOs and 
the role of underwriters’ during the going-public period concentrate on asymmetric information 
and its effect on stock-price performance. Baron (1982) and Dimovski et al. (2011) argue that 
asymmetric information exists between the well-informed underwriters and the less-informed 
issuers; therefore, underwriters are able to price new issues below the market equilibrium to 
reduce the probability that they will absorb losses due to unsold shares. Chen and Firth (1999) 
report a positive relation between underwriter reputation and accuracy of earnings forecasts. 
Ghikas et al. (2008) find that underwriters align their interests with the pre-IPO stockholders, 
                                                 
11 Underwriters in the Greek stock market are either large banks (e.g., the National Bank of Greece, EFG Eurobank, Alpha 
Bank, and Piraeus Bank) or major securities firms. 
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affecting the quality of the earnings forecast by not incorporating adverse information provided 
by auditing of qualified reports. Overall, the aim of reputable underwriters is to maintain their 
reputation by associating themselves with more accurate disclosure information and better long-
term returns to their loyal customers and retail investors. 
 
Market conditions (Hot/Cold): This study uses a dummy variable to account for market 
conditions. This dummy variable takes the value of 1 for IPO firms that are listed during a hot 
period, and 0 for those listed during a cold period. The classification hot period versus cold 
period is based on the intensity of IPO listing activity. The rationale underlying this control 
variable is that if an earnings forecast takes place during a hot period (i.e. the periods with large 
number of listings in the ASE) and the actual earning appears in the cold period, then the results 
can be lower than expected (optimistic forecast), leading to a high forecast error. Conversely, if 
an earnings forecast occurs during a cold period and the actual earning is announced during a hot 
period, then the actual earning can be much higher than expected (pessimistic forecast), leading 
to a high forecast error. Thomadakis et al. (2012) show a strong relation between cold IPO 
periods and long-term performance. They point out that some IPOs are issued in hot markets, 
when long-term expectations are low and the general level of the stock market is decreasing, 
while other issues take place during cold periods, when long-term returns projections are 
promising.   
  
Given Ownership: The monitoring of managerial actions –such as management earnings 
forecasts– depends to a large extent on firm ownership structure. The literature indicates  that a 
high (low) percentage of retained (given) ownership signals high quality of a firm (e.g., Li and 
McConomy (2004)12. Managements of such IPO firms believe in the strength and potential of 
their companies and have a strong motivation to provide accurate earnings forecasts. Accuracy is 
appreciated by long-term investors and encourages them to keep their position in the firm, 
supporting its investment plans. This creates better conditions for good long-term returns. 
Evidence from Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) indicates a direct relationship between the 
proportion of shares retained by owners and long-term performance of IPO firms. Jain and 
Kini (1994) argue that long-run underperformance can be partly explained by low managerial 
incentives following an IPO.  
                                                 
12 Li and McConomy (2004) show that earnings forecast and retained ownership decisions are jointly determined by 
managers after controlling for other factors that affect each decision independently. They document a substitution effect 




4.4 Description of Model 
 
AFE and FE vary across companies. We construct cross-sectional models to explain these 
variations and regress AFE and FE on macroeconomic and firm-specific factors as follows.  
AFE or FE = a0 + a 1 Size + a2 Age + a3 TimeLag + a4 Privatization + a5 Oversub + a6 
Underwriter + a7 HotCold + a8 Ownership + a9 Industry +  εi    (5) 
 
Negative signs are expected on size (Size), age (Age), privatized firms (Privatization), level of 
oversubscription (Oversub), and underwriter quality (Underwriter); plausibly, these factors as 
proxies of an issuer’s quality and perceived prestige result in the production of more accurate 
forecasts. Positive signs with AFE are expected for those factors that are likely to instill greater 
uncertainty in IPO investors such as the length of listing period (TimeLag), market conditions 
(HotCold), given ownership (Ownership), and industrial classification (Industry)  . 
 
 Further, we test for long-term performance using the following model. 
 
FF3F or (FF3F-CAR) = a0+ a 1 Size + a2 Age + a3 TimeLag + a4 Privatization + a5 Oversub + 
a6 Underwriter + a7 HotCold + a8 Ownership + a9 Industry + a10 MAN {or + a11 AFE} {or +a12 
FE} (6) 
 
[Insert Appendix A about here] 
  
5. Empirical results on profit forecasts 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A of Table 1 provides an annualized listing of the 303 Greek IPOs that have been 
listed in the local stock market since 1993. It also classifies earnings forecasts into mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure. Among the 83 listed IPOs during the voluntary disclosure period, 22 
did not include earnings forecasts in their prospectuses. Overall, the sample of IPOs listed under 
the voluntary disclosure environment is relatively small, as the Greek debt crisis of 2009 to 2015 
has affected the number of new listings. It is noteworthy that there have been no IPOs over the 
last five years of this study. The last time the ASE experienced three consecutive years without 
an IPO was in the 1980s. 
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 Panel B of Table 1 reports the average values of market capitalization, firm age, 
oversubscription and given ownership for each year in the sample period. Further, it partitions 
the sample based on whether earnings forecasts are optimistic or pessimistic. The optimistic 
(pessimistic) group includes firms with high (low) forecasts compared to the actual earnings 
realized after the IPO. The optimistic sample typically comprises larger firms (mean market 
capitalization is € 62.06 million versus € 26.05 million for the pessimistic sample). The 
optimistic (pessimistic) group is also associated with a more (less) favorable appeal to IPO 
investors evidenced by an average subscription multiple of 110.5 (79.8). In contrast, firm age and 
the percentage of given ownership fail to generate statistically significant differences between 
the two groups. Table 2 provides the distribution of IPOs per industry with a further breakdown 
by disclosure period (mandatory versus voluntary). The main two industries represented in the 
sample are finance, insurance and real estate (25.41%) and mining and construction industries 
(19.80%). Chemical and health industries account only for 2.64% of sample IPOs each.  
 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 
The summary statistics of absolute forecast errors, forecast errors, and adjusted returns 
for one, two, and three years after going public are shown in Table 3. The means, medians, and 
standard deviations are broken down by mandatory and voluntary periods. The mean (median) 
forecast error for the total sample is 3.66% (–0.38%). The positive sign reveals that, on average, 
forecasts are less than the actual profits, leading to pessimistic forecasts. When breaking down 
the forecast error by mandatory and voluntary disclosure regimes, the results reveal a positive 
mean of 8.65% for firms listed during the mandatory period and a negative mean of  –9.58% for 
firms listed during the voluntary period. This tells us that firms are more conservative when 
compelled to provide forecasts in their prospectuses, and therefore, actual profits are typically 
higher than forecasts. Once the disclosure environment turns voluntary, Greek IPO firms behave 
differently and the forecast error sign changes, indicating more optimistic forecasts than the 
actual earnings. This lends support to the argument that earnings forecasts during voluntary 
periods are generally optimistic. 
 Long-term performance of Greek IPOs varies depending on the disclosure environment. 
IPOs in mandatory regime period with pessimistic forecasts present positive long-term returns 
with an average of 16.34% after three years (ER3Y1D). When the disclosure regime changes to 
voluntary and the forecasts turn optimistic, the average three-year long-term return becomes 
negative, –34.68%. This result indicates that investors reward a pessimistic earning forecast 
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approach by management, as they prefer to see better actual earnings one year after the IPO than 
forecasts.  
 Long-term returns from the end of the first month of trading are negative for all IPOs. 
More specifically, firms going public under a mandatory disclosure environment experience 
negative returns after 1 (ER1Y1M), 2 (ER2Y1M), and 3 (ER3Y1M) years from going public of 
–16.41%, –27.64%, and –8.88%, respectively. Those firms that voluntarily provide earnings 
forecasts offer negative returns of –10.09%, –31.79%, and –32.53% over the same periods. IPOs 
in mandatory regime period provide better long-term returns compared to those in voluntary 
regime period two and three years after going public. The difference in long-term returns is 
statistically significant at conventional levels. 
In summary, Table 3 indicates that long term returns during the mandatory regime 
outperform those during the voluntary regime two (three) years after the IPO. The rationale 
underlying this result is that actual earnings tend to be better than the forecasts in the mandatory 
regime (hence good news, better returns), but lower than the forecasts in the voluntary regime 
(hence bad news, worse returns). 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Table 4 (Panel A) provides the frequency distribution of forecast errors. Forecast errors 
are, on average, mainly positive (negative) during the mandatory (voluntary) period meaning that 
forecasts for most firms are lower (higher) than actual results. It appears that most Greek firms 
providing mandatory (voluntary) forecast earnings have been underestimating (overestimating) 
their forecast profits and are generally more (less) conservative during mandatory (voluntary) 
disclosure period. The mean AFE for Greek companies is 40.32%, 36.83%, and 39.72% for 
mandatory, voluntary, and combined samples, respectively. The majority of IPOs in the 
mandatory and voluntary samples experience an AFE of less than 25% (92 IPOs listed under the 
mandatory regime and 30 IPOs listed under the voluntary regime). Since the regulation changed, 
giving the choice to IPO firms to provide an earnings forecast only when they feel confident to 
do so, 18 out of 61 IPOs (31.14%) announced AFE higher than 50%, which provides preliminary 
evidence in support of improved forecast accuracy.  
 




Panel B of Table 4 analyzes the long-term performance based on year of issuance and the 
disclosure of earnings forecasts (mandatory versus voluntary). There is clear evidence that IPO 
firms that mandatorily disclose earnings forecasts experience much better long-term returns than 
others. More specifically, the IPOs that mandatorily provide earnings forecasts have an average 
return of –8.88% compared to –32.53 for firms that voluntarily provide earnings forecasts. 
Similar results are found using alternative long-term performance measures over two and three 
years following the IPO. Individual-year cases are sometimes surprising. For instance, newly-
listed firms in the hot period of 1999 enjoyed good long-term returns of 22.98%, 4.19%, and 
10.09%, one, two, and three years after going public, respectively. Further, IPO firms with 
voluntary earnings disclosure do not seem to be good long-term investments, because of the 
severe negative long-term returns. IPO firms listed in 2002 present positive one-year return, 
1.36%, but extremely large second- and third-year negative returns of –46.42% and –92.04%, 
respectively. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Table 5 presents the frequency distribution of the forecast errors in relation to long-term 
performance. IPOs with low forecast errors during the mandatory period are rewarded with 
positive long-term returns (i.e. 12.86%, 38.93%, and 30.15%, for first, second and third year 
after listing, respectively), while newly-listed firms with forecast error above 80% have strongly 
negative returns (i.e. –13.54%, –35.38%, and –69.81%, for first, second and third year after 
listing, respectively). Similarly, IPOs with AFE below 10% offer positive long-term returns of 
42.33%, 36.38%, and 25.22% depending on the horizon, while those with inaccurate forecasts 
(AFE above 100%) have negative returns of –38.53%, –15.92%, and –42.55% depending on the 
horizon. 
The results do not qualitatively change when we examine the voluntary sample. Only 
IPOs with low forecast error offer positive three-year long-term returns (16.14%). New issues 
with AFE lower than 10% offer marginally positive returns to their investors. As expected, when 
management is unable to offer accurate absolute forecasts (AFE above 100%), the returns are, on 
average, strongly negative for two and three years after the IPO, suggesting that investors punish 
IPOs that do not provide earnings forecasts in their prospectuses during the voluntary period. 
The 22 IPOs that elected to avoid announcing management earnings forecasts experienced severe 
negative long-term returns of –20.38%, –40.20%, and –50.35% one, two, and three years after 
going public, respectively. 
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In summary, the findings in Table 5 indicate that post-IPO long-run performance (in 
particular the last column of Table 5) is the highest for IPOs during the mandatory period 
(16.34%), followed by IPOs during the voluntary period with voluntary management forecasts (–
34.68%), and is the lowest for IPOs during the voluntary period without management forecasts 
(–50.35%). Such differences in the long-run performance may be at least partially attributable to 
a different market sentiment rather than a poorer quality of IPOs during the voluntary period or 
other confounding factors. Consequently, it is a mistaken strategy to ignore the prevailing 
disclosure regime when analyzing IPO performance.  
 
Table 6 reports pairwise correlations for all explanatory variables used in the study. The 
correlation coefficients are low, suggesting that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem for 
our sample. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
5.2 Regression analysis 
 
Table 7 splits long-term performance results by mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
period. Our intention is to explore the explanatory factors (other than forecast accuracy) of IPO 
long-term returns under the two disclosure regimes. To capture possible time trends, we use first, 
second, and third year returns. Further, to reduce the effect of any aberration in the early trading 
period (such as investment banker’s price support), we measure returns beginning from the first 
day of trading and from the first month.  
The results obtained from the mandatory sample reveal that up to one year post-IPO large 
firms realize negative returns but this is to reverse over a two-year period. Once the regime 
changes to voluntary earnings forecasts, the results become surprisingly robust as evidenced by a 
consistently positive and statistically significant coefficient for all measures of returns. Firm age 
also yields a more definite association with long-term returns under the voluntary period but with 
an opposite (negative) direction. The coefficient sign is in accord with the intuitive principle that 
longer operational experience reduces risk and that in turn limits realized returns.  
The next statistically significant relation is exhibited by the coefficient on the 
privatization dummy. Similarly, the positive correlation is indicative of the higher risk 
underpinning the long-run viability of organizations which have only existed under the state 
control and, following the IPO, are expected to compete in a market-driven business 
environment. In addition, high oversubscription during the bookbuilding period is a signal for 
good long-term returns. The mandatory period (exclusively) illustrates this fact in an 
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unambiguous manner. That is, the negative association with first year returns turns to a positive 
and highly statistically significant relation (at the 5% level or higher) for the returns of 
subsequent years. The finding that reputable underwriters barely give rise to a discernible pattern 
with performance is surprising, albeit robust under both regimes. The limited Greek IPO market 
and the even more limited number of local underwrites pose as the main culprits for the random 
variation in returns. As expected, IPOs listed during a cold period are associated with better 
returns over a three-year period, highlighting the significance of market conditions during the 
public offering period. In contrast to the mandatory sample, a high percentage of given 
ownership is rewarded with good investor returns over the voluntary period. Finally, we 
document no statistically significant evidence in support of either the length of the number of 
days elapsing between the prospectus filing date and actual listing date or the company’s 
particular sector. 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
Table 8 reports the results from regressing absolute forecast error and forecast error on 
the disclosure regime (mandatory versus voluntary) along with a number of control variables 
suggested by the literature. These regressions are in the spirit of prior literature and the adjusted 
R2s are similar to existing studies. The regressions models are estimated using robust standard 
errors. 
 
Columns 1 and 2 use the full sample of 281 IPO firms that provide a forecast during the 
mandatory (220 IPO firms) and the voluntary regime period (61 IPO firms) to shed light on the 
association with AFE and FE. Indeed, as per Hypothesis 1, the requirement for mandatory 
disclosure of earnings forecasts is strongly and positively associated with the production of 
inaccurate statements. We evidence this by means of a positive and statistically significant (at the 
5% level) coefficient on the Mandatory dummy when using AFE as the dependent variable. 
Replacing AFE with FE, we obtain additional insight on the cause of the observed inaccuracy. 
Specifically, the resulting positive and highly statistically significant coefficient (at the 1% level) 
evidences the systematic understatement of profit estimates in prospectuses compared to the 
actual realized ones. This trend is in line with increased conservatism from issuers as a form of 




To ensure that the results are not mainly driven by size or other features remaining 
idiosyncratic to the mandatory regime, we employ a matched-sample approach. Specifically, for 
each of the 61 IPOs in the voluntary regime, we select and assign a closest-neighbor from the 
220 IPOs available in the mandatory era. In columns 3 and 4 the matching principle is based on 
proximity in size (proxied by assets) and industry. In columns 5 and 6 matching is attained using 
industry and firm age at the time of IPO. Overall, irrespectively of the matching criterion 
employed, findings confirm the monotonic relation; the mandatory period relates positively to 
absolute forecast error as well as forecast error. In passing, we observe that sub-sampling, 
whether this is conducted on size, age or industry, maintains the statistical significance of the 
resulting coefficients (at the 5% level or higher) and, thus, appears conducive to highlighting the 
postulated effect.   
The rest forecast accuracy determinants appear interesting in their own right. Drawing 
evidence from the full sample, we first encounter a positive association with firm size. Contrary 
to our prediction, AFE increases in forecasts produced by issuers with a larger asset base while 
FE remains unaffected. Notably, this is not the first study to document the seemingly contrarian 
relation. Lonkani and Firth (2005) have provided similar evidence by showing that AFE is 
positively correlated with size in a sample of Thai IPOs. On the other hand, Time lag confronts 
to the expected (positive) association with AFE. Conceivably, the longer the time interval is, the 
greater the likelihood for erroneous estimates and variability in the underlying assumptions 
emerges. Further, the negative and highly statistically significant (at the 1% level) coefficient on 
the hot period dummy is in line with the notion that in overheated markets accuracy is a lesser 
concern and issuers can deviate from it rather safely. Finally, the percentage of given ownership 
inversely relates to AFE. This finding is in line with the quality image accompanying those 
issuers which sell equity with frugality. Parenthetically, it is noteworthy that age does not 
confirm the predicted effect on accuracy even when IPOs are matched based on this criterion 
(although the size & industry subsample reveals some negative association at the 10% level of 
significance). 
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
Table 9 explores how the prevailing disclosure regime (captured by the Mandatory 
dummy variable) and a number of other control variables affect the long-term performance of 
IPOs using FF3F-CARs as dependent variables. The results confirm that IPOs in the mandatory 
rather than the voluntary period realize superior returns (Columns 1-6). Further, the fact that 
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statistical significance is obtained only for coefficients in the regressions engaging 2, and 
especially, 3-year returns evidences that time accentuates the positive relation. This finding 
boosts the rationale of this study that management earnings forecasts can be a strong tool in the 
hands of investors and can drive them toward their future investment decisions. In particular, 
with a greater number of subsequent accounting periods to report earnings which consistently 
and sizably outperform the expectations created by the initial forecast in the IPO prospectus, the 
euphoric sentiment of investors reflects on the upward trend of long-term returns. In parallel, the 
extent of conservatism that, on average, surrounds profit forecasts is fully revealed. This finding 
proves robust across the various measures of returns and the corresponding periods (as, for 
example, whether ER3Y1M or ER3Y1D is employed). 
Focusing on marginal effects constitutes an alternative way to shed light on the 
association with long-term performance. To this end, Columns 7-8 augment the baseline 
specification with AFE which is also allowed to interact with Mandatory. The resulting 
coefficients on the new terms convey important intuition on market investors’ perceptions of 
forecast accuracy. In particular, focusing on the ER3Y1D regression, we find a negative sign for 
the interaction term and a positive direction for AFE. Taken together, the effect of AFE on 
ER3Y1D, given a mandatory period, emerges negative (estimated as 0.00272-0.0139 = -
0.01118). That is, amidst the general conservatism of that period, accuracy was still rewarded by 
means of higher long-term returns. This fact suggests that issuers should always strive for 
disseminating reliable information regardless of the prevailing regulatory regime. In addition, 
conservative forecasts cannot and should be not used as a tool for attaining higher market 
valuations as the market is shown capable of identifying and penalizing speculative behaviors. 
Corroborating this relation, Columns 9-10 substitute AFE for FE and report qualitatively similar 
results. 
Our examination of control variables begins with size. The results reveal a positive 
relation between large IPOs and good long-term performance. The coefficient for company age 
is negative only when returns are calculated from the end of the first month of trading and only 
for one year. This indicates that investors in companies with short operational history before 
listing enjoy better one-year returns. The sign of the coefficient is inconsistent with the 
prediction for greater forecast accuracy of IPOs with long histories before going public. 
Moreover the privatization variable is in the expected direction; the positive coefficient indicates 
that privatized firms experience superior one-year returns. Our finding indicates that state-owned 
firms going public have greater earnings forecast accuracy and better returns in the long-run. 
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Thus, investors should take advantage of similar opportunities and participate in privatized 
company issues. 
The coefficient for market condition H/C provides very challenging results. It shows that 
firms going public during hot periods offer better returns up to the one-year period. Everything 
appears to change in cold periods, since IPOs provide better returns to their investors after two 
and three listing years. This suggests that the “hot-market effect” continues its influence on good 
IPO returns from issuance day and until one year after going public. This effect weakens 
between the first and second year, and it is cold IPOs that expect better returns in the 22-month 
post-IPO period. Overall, these results suggest that there is more space for underperformance 
among cold IPO issues, since their share price remains at a low level in the immediate 
aftermarket. The price adjustment to new information becomes rapid, as earnings announcement 
is the reason behind better long-term returns to investors. 
  
 [Insert Table 9 about here] 
. 
6. Additional robustness checks:  
6.1 A non-parametric approach of the relation between IPO returns and 
disclosure regime 
Although findings lend support to a more pronounced IPO underperformance under 
voluntary disclosure, one may not rule out the possibility that the effect is partially distorted by 
endogeneity. In particular, it is possible that the two time periods gave rise to distinct firm or 
market level characteristics (likely unobservable) which ultimately determined the aftermarket 
performance. We address this concern by means of the non-parametric technique of propensity 
score matching (PSM). Through the integration of the confounding characteristics, PSM matches 
observations from two samples in a simultaneous procedure. Therefore, framing the mandatory 
(voluntary) regime as the treatment (control) group, the observed difference in means captures 
the effect that is exclusively due to treatment. For enhanced robustness, we apply four distinct 
PSM approaches: i) nearest neighbor, ii) radius, iii) Kernel and iv) stratification for returns 
calculated from the first day as well as the end of the first month. Table 10 summarizes the 
results. 
The nearest neighbor matching method (Panel A) assigns each mandatory disclosure IPO 
a voluntary counterpart based on propensity score proximity. Accordingly, it is observed that 
long-term returns considerably deteriorate in the voluntary period. Notably, the effect is 
amplified with the length of the interval over which returns are measured; first-year return 
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differences, while large in absolute magnitude, are smaller than second year and sill these results 
are dwarfed by third year differences. Notably, the three-year returns not only account for the 
largest effect (ER3Y1D –82.76; ER3Y1M –48.74) but also generate the highest levels of 
statistical significance as evidenced by the t-statistic (ER3Y1D –3.94; ER3Y1M –4.83). 
The radius matching method (Panel B) matches each mandatory disclosure IPO to the 
average of all voluntary disclosure IPOs with propensity scores within a radius of 0.1. The 
Kernel matching method (Panel C) matches mandatory disclosure IPOs to a weighted mean of 
voluntary disclosure IPOs with the weight being inversely related to the distance between the 
scores of treatment and control group observations. The stratification matching method (Panel D) 
splits further the sample in a number of subsamples, strata, and estimates the average difference 
in the effect for each stratum. Subsequently, a final average is calculated, adjusted for the 
different size of strata. Overall, the results obtained from the four PSM methods remain 
qualitatively similar. Statistical significance appears troublesome only for ER1Y1M and 
ER2Y1M with low t-statistics, while ER1Y1D and ER2Y1D attain all conventional thresholds. 
The evidence on three-year returns is invariably robust. 
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
  
6.2. Evidence from the disclosure dichotomy in the voluntary period 
The main conclusion of this study is that mandatory disclosure of earnings forecast in the 
prospectus of IPOs is associated with better returns over the long-run. We have attributed this 
association to issuers’ need to insulate themselves from low tail risk and the multifaceted 
implications caused by a likely failure to deliver results commensurate with forecast 
expectations. However, our reporting conservatism argument could be rendered questionable if 
evidence from an environment providing fully discretion on profit forecast disclosure (i.e. 
voluntary period) reveals significant differences in the aftermarket performance based on the 
disclosure decision prior to the IPO. 
Therefore, an important robustness implication pertains to the 27% of IPO firms that did 
not provide an earnings forecast under the voluntary regime. The main research question here is 
whether there is a systematic reason behind this reporting behavior. To address this concern, we 
investigate in Column 1 of Table 11 the characteristics of those issuers producing this extra piece 
of information when it is not statutorily required. As it may have been surmised, disclosing 
issuers are larger (proxied by assets), more experienced (proxied by age) and, as a consequence, 
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they draw more of investors’ demand (proxied by oversubscription).  Interestingly, the positive 
and highly significant coefficient on the percentage of given ownership (at the 1% level) 
constitutes an exception to the overall quality image of these issuers. Therefore, one may argue 
that the distinction should be based more accurately on issuer’s confidence to predict future 
results rather than overall quality. 
Columns 2-4 regress long-term returns (measured from the first day to one, two and three 
years after going public) on the newly introduced ‘VolFor’ indicator variable for disclosing 
versus non-disclosing firms and all the control variables previously employed. Accordingly, the 
fact that issuers providing forecasts fail to establish a statistically significant association with any 
measure of long-term return offers additional evidence to refute a likely quality advantage over 
the rest firms in the voluntary sample. Summarizing, and addressing our research question, the 
results indicate that small firms with low operational history do not feel comfortable providing 
earnings forecasts after liberalization of the regime. These firms tend to list during the upwards 
phase of the economy to take advantage of market euphoria and they can also have their fair 
chance at fulfilling their own upward potential. 
 




The main purpose of this study is to provide, for the first time, evidence of long-term 
performance differences between IPOs that were obliged to provide earnings forecasts in their 
prospectuses and those that were allowed to voluntarily disclose earnings forecasts. Indeed, the 
results indicate that IPO shares’ aftermarket performance (excluding the first day of trading) 
significantly deteriorates in the voluntary period. This behavioral change implies a penalty scare 
under the voluntary regime, for providing inaccurate earnings forecasts in the prospectus, de-
motivating investors from holding their positions in IPOs for a long period, and affecting long-
term returns, driving them toward a negative sign. In addition, it appears that post-IPO long-run 
performance is highest for IPOs during the mandatory period, followed by IPOs with voluntary 
management forecasts and those without management forecasts. This variation in long-run 
performance may not be attributed to poorer quality of IPOs in the voluntary period. Instead, this 
study verifies decreased earnings forecast accuracy associated with the mandatory disclosure 
regime. Collectively, the evidence is in accord with the systematic production of pessimistic 
forecasts within the latter period that is largely driven by the spirit of accounting conservatism 
and lawsuit avoidance. 
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 Notably, IPOs that provide immensely more erroneous forecasts in the mandatory 
regime, compared to other issuers of the same period, incur the cost of a significantly worse 
long-term performance. Therefore, setting initial expectations at a low level in order to exceed 
them effortlessly over the subsequent reporting periods is clearly a shortsighted strategy; every 
IPO issuer should make a best effort to produce accurate earnings forecasts. In line with this 
conclusion, firms with low forecast error during the mandatory period offer brilliant long-term 
returns. This signals that management’s best effort is rewarded by the market and appreciated by 
shareholders. 
A close look at AFE shows positive long-term returns in cases of error below 50% for the 
mandatory sample, while when AFE is higher than 50%, long-term returns turn negative. Similar 
results emerge for the voluntary sample, with only firms presenting AFE below 10% associated 
with positive long-term returns over a three-year period. It appears that investors are one step 
ahead of regulators and penalize even before the authorities, with strong negative returns, those 
firms that are unable to provide reliable earnings forecasts. 
Cross-sectional regressions are used to explore the factors that affect long-term 
performance and to identify the differences between mandatory and voluntary earnings forecast 
regimes. For firms that must provide earnings forecasts, long-term performance improves during 
a cold period with low given ownership and high level of oversubscription. Moreover, the age 
variable, in line with Ritter (1991), indicates that young, growing companies are able to produce 
positive future returns. Market conditions during the IPO period prove to be an important factor 
regarding trends in long-term performance. This relates mainly to pricing during the “cold IPO 
period.” In our opinion, during cold periods, there are no tendencies toward overpricing due to 
investor sentiment, but only weak counter-tendencies of underpricing due to weak issuer 
competition. This allows a window of opportunity for better long-term returns, which is well 
demonstrated by regression results for IPOs listed under the mandatory earnings forecast regime. 
In summary, we observe that under the voluntary regime, when earnings forecast error 
decreases, long-term performance suffers. This conclusion strengthens the recognition that IPO 
pricing is not efficient in the long-term, despite partial evidence of impressive short- or even 
medium-term gains. This anomaly should be corrected by the market. A step in this direction 
would be improving the ability of newly-listed firms to provide accurate earnings figures. As a 
result, investors’ fear of penalties by regulators would evaporate, their confidence would rise, 
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Appendix A:  Variables Definition  
 
Variable  Definition 
Panel A: Measures of Forecast Errors and Long Term Performance 
AFE 
Absolute Forecast Error. Measures the relative deviation of actual earnings (published in the Annual 
Report) from forecast earnings (announced in the prospectus of the firm). It is based on forecast of 
the next annual earnings. 
FE1 
Forecast Error is calculated as the difference between the forecast earnings (FE) and actual earnings 
(AE) deflated by the absolute value of FE. 
ER(1Y, 2Y, 3Y) 1D Adjusted returns from first day price to one, two and three year after going public. 
ER(1Y,2Y, 3Y) 1M Adjusted returns from first month price to one, two and three years after going public. 
Panel B: IPO Characteristics 
Size 
Market capitalization measured by the log of the total number of outstanding shares after the IPO 
multiplied by price per share. 
Age  Age of the firm starting from the year of its establishment until the year it goes public. 
TimeLag Period in days between the announcement of the prospectus and first day of the stocks’ listing.  
Privatization Dummy variable: 1 for Privatized IPOs, 0 otherwise.  
 Oversubscription Oversubscription is a demand multiple estimated as demand for IPO shares over shares offered. 
Underwriter 
Dummy variable: 1 for reputable underwriters (major banks), 0 otherwise. Reputable underwriters 
are classified based on three criteria (i) The number of IPOs they advised as lead underwriters (ii) 
the fee requested for the offered services. (iii) Capital raised for the public offering.  
HotCold 
Dummy Variable: 1 for IPOs listed during the Hot Period, 0 for IPOs listed during the cold period. 
Hot market is classified based on the intense IPO listing activity and high initial returns. This is a 
control variable for the state of the economy. Economy was much worse during the voluntary years 
so we control for this.  
 
Ownership Proportion f given ownership by the pre-IPO shareholders. 
Mandatory Dummy Variable: 1 for IPOs listed during 1993-2000, 0 otherwise. 
VolFor Dummy Variable: 1 for IPOs providing an earnings forecast in the period 2001-2015, 0 otherwise. 
Industry 
Separates industrial based companies from all other sectors. Dummy variable: 1 for industrial 
classified IPOs, 0 otherwise.  
 
 Panel C: Other Variables 
Optimistic Group 
In any case that Forecast Earnings appear to be higher than the Actual Earnings we report that IPO 
has made an 'Optimistic' Forecast.   
Pessimistic Group 
In the case that Forecast Earnings appear to be lower than the Actual Earnings we report that IPO 
has made a 'Pessimistic' Forecast.   
FF3F 
Fama and French (FF) three-factor model  
Rpt – Rft = ap + bp (Rmt – Rft) + sp SMBt + hp HMLt + ept. 
SMB 
Small minus Big. Spread in returns between small- and large-sized firms, based on the company's 
market capitalization. 
HML 
HML accounts for the spread in returns between value and growth stocks. HML argues that firms 
with high book-to-market ratios (value stocks) outperform those with low ones (growth stocks). 
Positive mean value for FE implies a pessimistic bias where forecasts earnings are less than actual earnings. Conversely, a 
negative mean value for FE indicates optimistic biases as forecast are higher than actual profits. The selection of ‘hot period’ is 
an important issue. Following methodologies by Yung et al. (2008), Boehme and Colak (2012), and Thomadakis et al. (2015a) 
market conditions per calendar quarter have a double criterion: on one hand, the number of IPOs performed during the quarter, on 
the other hand, ex-post market returns of the quarter. Summarizing the classifications of periods are, Hot Periods: 1993–1994, 
1997–2000, 2004–2006. Cold Periods: 1995–1996, 2001–2003, 2007–2015. 
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Table 1: Greek IPO sample description 
Panel A: Breakdown of Greek IPOsand control sample by forecasted profits 
Year IPO firms full sample Forecasted Profits 
  Mandatory Voluntary 
   Provide Forecast No Forecast 
1993 10 10   
1994 45 45   
1995 19 19   
1996 20 20   
1997 14 14   
1998 23 23   
1999 38 38   
2000 51 51   
2001 23  19 4 
2002 21  15 6 
2003 16  11 5 
2004 11  8 3 
2005 6  2 4 
2006 2  2  
2007 3  3  
2008  0  0  
2009  1  1  
2010–2015 
 
0  0  
Total 303 220 61 22 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of the positive and the negative IPO earnings group  (mean) 
 
Market Cap (million 
Euros) 
Age (years) Oversubscription (times) Given ownership (%) 
Year Optimistic Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic Optimistic Pessimistic 
1993 22.32 9.802 19.5 12 13.8 17.5 23.27 22.3 
1994 5.976 6.630 19.36 16.21 95.41 123.27 21.64 22.09 
1995 3.338 4.021 15.84 19 26.79 6.56 20.21 29.96 
1996 36.80 3.921 17.25 19 38.69 32.59 14.88 20.78 
1997 3.669 2.332 13.12 12.8 39.19 36.70 16.97 19.62 
1998 63.03 19.38 19.53 22.5 201.55 122.85 19.88 16.11 
1999 28.29 35.15 17.33 25.81 279.81 215.46 16.33 21.12 
2000 72.54 43.79 16.66 25.32 169.29 87.69 16.73 16.77 
2001 123.2 63.03 26.13 21.13 2.66 7.23 31.13 20.45 
2002 4.729 6.805 11.83 12.88 40.21 22.83 20.83 19.33 
2003 7.568 3.385 12.60 11.66 3.30 12.07 19.6 20.83 
2004 11.82 9.814 23.00 16.00 6.86 6.86 20.31 20.31 
2005 – 7.365 – 4 – 3.67 – 15.33 
2006 238.34 – 20.66 – 7.47 – 27.77 – 
2007 1085.70 330.63 45.66 13 4.53 6.13 33.16 22.92 
2008–15 74.13 – 10 – 2.13 – 29.13 – 
Average 62.06 26.05 18.20 19.55 110.50 79.80 19.74 20.67 
Δ mean  
p-value 
0.01 0.15 0.03 0.23 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the Greek IPOs in the sample. Panel A presents the number of firms listed in a mandatory disclosure 
environment, voluntary earnings forecast regime and IPOs that were not able to provide any forecast. Panel B divides the sample based on earnings 
forecast trend (Optimistic –Pessimistic). Optimistic group includes those firms with higher earnings forecast compared with the actual realized after the 
IPO and the pessimistic group includes those firms with lower earnings than the actual realized after the IPO. ‘Market capitalization’ is offer price times 
the number of shares outstanding at the first day of public trading. ‘Age’ of the firm is the year of offering minus the year of foundation or original 
incorporation. ‘Oversubscription’ is how many times more investors requested the offered by the firm shares during the IPO. ‘Given ownership’  is the 









    Table 2: Greek IPO industry identification 
 
This table shows the  distribution of 303 Greek IPOs (in absolute and percentage terms) by the Athens Stock Exchange industry classifications for the 
period of 1993-2015. The analysis engages the full samle (N=303 IPOs), IPOs during the mandatory disclosure period of 1993-2000 (N=220) and IPOs 
during the voluntary disclosure period of 2001-2015 (N=83). 
 
       
 Full sample 
(N= 303) 
Mandatory period 
(N = 220) 
Voluntary period 
(N=83) 
Industry Classification N % N %       N        % 
       
Chemicals  8 2.64 6 2.72 2 2.40 
Commercial 15 4.95 10 4.54 5 6.02 
Food 30 9.90 22 10.00 8 9.63 
Health 8 2.64 6 2.72 2 2.40 
Mining and construction industries 60 19.80 50 22.72 10 12.04 
Manufacturing 23 7.59 17 7.72 6 7.22 
Wholesale and retail trade 15 4.95 10 4.54 5 6.02 
Finance, insurance and real estate 77 25.41 54 24.54 23 27.71 
Service industries 13 4.29 6 2.72 7 8.43 
Technology  36 11.88 23 10.45 13 15.66 
Tourism and Travel 18 5.94 16 7..27 2 2.40 
Total 303 100% 220 100%       83 100% 
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Table 3: Summary statistics of forecast errors and measures of return 
 AFE FE ER1Y1D ER2Y1D ER3Y1D ER1Y1M ER2Y1M ER3Y1M 
Panel A: Total Sample       
Mean  39.72 3.66 3.94 –14.42 4.45 –15.09 –28.90 –16.26 
t-value (5.680)*** (–1.464) (0.783) (–2.38)** (0.450) (–4.17)*** (–6.12)*** (–1.76)* 
Median 31.03 –0.38 –19.69 –26.43 –23.66 –23.57 –30.40 –23.87 
z-value (8.66)*** (8.05)*** (3.35)*** (2.95)*** (3.65)*** (2.46)*** (2.10)*** (3.04)*** 
St-dev 34.52 52.81 84.23 101.13 165.68 60.25 78.01 146.92 
Max 234.82 234.82 556.95 559.61 746.86 329.41 306.83 728.83 
Min 0.38 –132.32 –152.52 –366.11 –454.20 –155.47 –310.84 –504.85 
No  303 303 303 303 303 303 303 303 
Panel B: Mandatory Disclosure Environment  (1993–2000)     
Mean  40.32 8.65 7.25 –7.86 16.34 –16.41 –27.64 –8.88 
t-value (18.01)*** (2.268) (0.914) (–1.290) (1.290) (–3.94)*** (–4.92)*** (–0.822) 
Median 31.65 2.96 –19.85 –25.58 2.16 –25.22 –30.40 –23.53 
z-value (1.703)*** (1.057) (3.23)*** (3.08)*** (3.23)*** (2.38)*** (2.22)*** (2.50)*** 
St-dev 34.38 52.35 89.80 109.59 176.37 62.71 83.81 157.14 
Max 234.82 234.82 556.95 559.61 746.86 329.41 306.83 728.83 
Min 0.38 –84.82 –152.52 –366.11 –454.20 –155.47 –310.84 –504.85 
No 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
Panel C: Voluntary Disclosure Environment (2001–2015)     
Mean  36.83 –9.58 –2.63 –32.26 –34.68 –10.09 –31.79 –32.53 
t-value (9.29)*** (–1.692)* (–0.225) (–4.08)*** (–2.36)*** (–1.400) (–4.52)*** (–2.357)* 
Median 26.40 –9.11 –18.59 –38.01 –52.26 –19.69 –26.17 –27.47 
z-value (1.436)* (0.994) (1.35)* (0.535) (1.478)** (0.913) (0.902) (1.76)*** 
St-dev 32.96 48.72 60.98 60.65 113.81 50.66 53.30 102.50 
Max 163.30 163.30 223.23 115.84 567.76 159.59 59.80 593.05 
Min 0.57 –90.30 –96.96 –149.65 –207.83 –90.79 –143.25 –191.77 
No 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 
Panel D: Test of difference between Mandatory and Voluntary means and medians. 
Mean (–0.125) (1.814)* (0.222) (2.69)*** (3.89)*** (0.129) (1.921)* (3.22)*** 
Median (–0.287) (1.887)* (0.835) (2.50)** (3.62)*** (0.486) (1.462) ( 3.19)*** 
FE: forecast error; FE = (Actual Profit (AP) – Forecast Profit (FP))│/Actual Profit (AP), AFE: absolute forecast error; AFE=│FE│,  ER1Y1D, Adjusted 
returns from first day price to first year after going public, ER2Y1D – Adjusted returns from first day price to two years after going public, ER3Y1D – Adjusted 
returns from first day price to three years after going public, ER1Y1M – Adjusted returns from first month price to one year after going public, ER2Y1M – 
Adjusted returns from first month price to two years after going public, ER3Y1M – Adjusted returns from first month price to three years after going public. The 
reason that the sample sizes from Panel A do not sum to the sample sizes of panels B and C is that we have 22 IPOs which decided not to provide earnings 
forecasts during the voluntary disclosure period. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Time series data on forecast errors and measures of return 
Panel A: Summary of FE and AFE by year of listing and by status of Management Earnings Forecast 
Mandatory (1993–2000) 
Listing Year AFE (%) <25% 25% to 50% >50% FE (%) <–20% –20% to 20% >20% 
1993 21.56 5 5 0 –4.12 4 4 2 
1994 37.22 18 14 13 –0.02 16 13 16 
1995 48.86 7 5 7 33.36 4 5 10 
1996 47.17 10 4 6 11.28 7 8 5 
1997 32.58 6 4 4 3.77 5 4 5 
1998 35.75 11 4 8 15.98 4 10 9 
1999 50.70 14 7 17 10.09 14 9 15 
2000 38.18 21 15 15 4.90 18 18 15 
1993–2000 40.32 92 58 70 8.65 72 71 77 
Voluntary (2001–2015) 
2001 37.37 8 6 5 –26.61 9 8 2 
2002 50.60 6 3 6 –4.05 7 6 2 
2003 39.62 5 3 3 –4.32 5 4 2 
2004 25.81 6 0 2 –7.10 2 4 2 
2005 46.63 1 0 1 –31.41 1 1 0 
2006 8.62 2 0 0 8.62   0 1 1 
2007 19.81 2 0 1 –0.55 1 1 1 
2008 - - - - - - - - 
2009 28.31 0 1 0 28.31 0 1 0 
2010-2015 - - - - - - - - 
2001–2015 36.83 30 13 18 –9.58 25 26 10 
Total 39.72 122 71 88 3.98 97 97 87 
 
Panel B: Long term performance classified by mandatory and voluntary disclosure regulation 
Mandatory (1993–2000) 
Listing Year ER1Y1D No ER2Y1D No ER3Y1D No ER1Y1M No ER2Y1M No ER3Y1M No  
1993 –13.45 10 2.32 10 90.01 10 –19.59 10 –13.88 10 53.05 10 
1994 –1.04 45 29.61 45 137.50 45 –8.08 45 20.12 45 85.56 45 
1995 –0.75 19 –54.07 19 –49.97 19 4.87 19 –51.21 19 –62.60 19 
1996 –42.00 20 –71.89 20 –136.35 20 –57.17 20 –134.48 20 –159.26 20 
1997 51.01 14 –32.22 14 –62.25 14 9.26 14 –104.10 14 –123.98 14 
1998 69.45 23 7.80 23 11.43 23 –45.57 23 –35.09 23 –34.23 23 
1999 22.98 38 4.19 38 10.09 38 –13.25 38 –14.50 38 –5.10 38 
2000 –9.63 51 –10.59 51 4.34 51 –11.10 51 –11.34 51 8.81 51 
1993-2000 7.25  -7.86  16.34  -16.41  -27.64  -8.88  
Voluntary (2001–2015) 
2001 15.47 19 29.91 19 19.66 19 11.39 19 23.93 19 19.47 19 
2002 1.36 15 –46.42 15 –92.04 15 –17.60 15 –28.59 15 –57.32 15 
2003 –9.84 11 –78.93 11 –58.30 11 –18.76 11 –87.14 11 –67.21 11 
2004 –49.44 8 –85.50 8 –63.30 8 –49.98 8 –89.89 8 –71.93 8 
2005 6.33 2 –23.41 2 3.88 2 9.43 2 –16.45 2 26.42 2 
2006 –11.76 2 –38.35 2 –20.39 2 –22.23 2 –41.91 2 –22.82 2 
2007 4.44 3 –27.15 3 30.34 3 13.45 3 –29.46 3 –34.03 3 
2009 –2.54 1 –23.71 1 – 0 7.83 1 –12.02 1 – 0 
2001–2015 –2.63  –32.26  –34.68  –10.09  –31.79  –32.53  
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                            Table 5: IPO long-term returns based on forecast accuracy 





















FE≤–0.6 18 6.86 –5.61 22.12 0<AFE≤0.1 28 42.33 36.38 25.22 
–0.6<FE≤0.4 21 –7.25 –6.96 –2.59 0.1<AFE≤0.2 41 –1.64 1.39 58.79 
–0.4<FE≤–0.2 32 –11.32 –15.09 65.96 0.2<AFE≤0.3 32 18.06 23.54 49.10 
–0.2<FE≤–0.1 18 –15.56 –14.98 –33.60 0.3<AFE≤0.4 20 –6.98 –29.94 10.02 
–0.1<FE≤0 16 66.33 15.63 10.09 0.4<AFE≤0.5 20 –10.53 –11.05 19.03 
0<FE≤0.1 19 12.86 38.93 30.15 0.5<AFE≤0.6 19 –10.09 3.42 –4.68 
0.1<FE≤0.2 21 –23.76 –13.60 82.13 0.6<AFE≤0.7 17 61.14 –25.41 6.53 
0.2<FE≤0.4 20 –20.12 –44.84 –11.34 0.7<AFE≤0.8 10 20.98 –57.76 –84.03 
0.4<FE≤0.6 18 –15.93 6.56 18.62 0.8<AFE≤0.9 12 –22.64 –59.83 –15.97 
0.6<FE≤0.8 17 35.72 –51.34 –33.00 0.9<AFE≤1.00 10 –17.39 –21.31 –75.70 
FE≥0.8 20 –13.54 –35.38 –69.81 AFE≥100 11 –38.53 –15.92 –42.55 
      220 7.25  –7.86 16.34 
          
Panel B: Voluntary (2001–2015) 
FE≤–0.6 8 –27.05 –36.00 –51.75 0<AFE≤0.1 10 16.20 –0.66 0.67 
–0.6<FE≤0.4 11 –8.08 –70.48 –94.89 0.1<AFE≤0.2 12 5.69 –27.14 –38.49 
–0.4<FE≤–0.2 5 –9.04 –27.45 –41.82 0.2<AFE≤0.3 4 –38.10 –75.55 –67.86 
–0.2<FE≤–0.1 5 –26.29 –42.13 –26.46 0.3<AFE≤0.4 4 6.87 –1.99 –28.35 
–0.1<FE≤0 6 44.15 15.88 –10.76 0.4<AFE≤0.5 8 16.22 –56.07 –60.18 
0<FE≤0.1 6 –7.50 –10.60 16.14 0.5<AFE≤0.6 6 –28.26 –69.16 –90.57 
0.1<FE≤0.2 11 18.12 –13.95 –44.20 0.6<AFE≤0.8 7 –28.29 –4.32 –48.67 
FE≥0.2 9 7.27 –53.51 –29.82 AFE≥0.8 10 1.37 –36.46 –46.89 
      61 –2.63 –32.26 –34.68 
Panel C: No Forecast  




Table 6: Correlation matrix 
 
 Size Age TimeLag Privatization Oversub Undwriter HotCold Ownership Industry  Mandatory 
Size 1.0000          
Age 0.2939    1.0000         
TimeLag -0.2366   -0.0726    1.0000        
Privatization 0.3964    0.2020   -0.0892    1.0000       
Oversub  -0.1325    0.0579    0.0225   -0.1007    1.0000      
Undwriter 0.2285    0.1275   -0.0247   -0.0431   -0.0419    1.0000     
HotCold 0.0731   -0.0267    0.0361    0.0436    0.0910   -0.0611    1.0000    
Ownership 0.1799   -0.0381    0.1036    0.0917   -0.2120    0.0526    0.0391    1.0000   
Industry 0.0356    0.0260    0.0006    0.0460   -0.0115    0.1049   -0.0343    0.0447    1.0000  
Mandatory -0.0271    0.1248    0.2626   -0.0921    0.3541    0.1094   -0.0519   -0.0285   -0.0575    1.0000 
The table presents pairwise correlations of the variables. The sample consists of Greek initial public offerings listed over the period January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2015. All variables 


























 Mandatory period Voluntary period 
 Constant 2.153** 0.666 –3.215*** –2.635 –3.862*** –2.872** –6.850*** –4.029*** –2.749*** –4.335** 
 (0.026) (0.442) (0.002) (0.133) (0.003) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.022) 
Size –0.118** –0.032 0.145*** 0.123 0.210*** 0.157*** 0.340*** 0.221*** 0.138*** 0.200** 
 (0.022) (0.442) (0.008) (0.157) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.034) 
Age –0.0019 –0.0049* 0.002 –0.0007 –0.011*** –0.011*** –0.0156** –0.010*** –0.007** –0.0106* 
 (0.693) (0.067) (0.586) (0.918) (0.003) (0.0009) (0.026) (0.002) (0.022) (0.079) 
TimeLag 0.0040 0.00303 0.006 0.0028 0.005 –0.0091 0.0032 0.0031 0.0012 0.0050 
 (0.334) (0.420) (0.128) (0.746) (0.497) (0.275) (0.821) (0.582) (0.876) (0.675) 
Privatization 0.440* 0.393* –0.017 0.250 0.168 0.354** 0.162 0.0710 0.356** 0.0495 
 (0.055) (0.095) (0.956) (0.757) (0.368) (0.044) (0.690) (0.703) (0.021) (0.855) 
Oversub –0.0002 –0.0004** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.0014 0.0005 –0.0043 –0.0013 0.0008 –0.0015 
 (0.469) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009) (0.716) (0.917) (0.317) (0.628) (0.855) (0.776) 
Underwriter –0.0319 –0.163* 0.079 0.228 –0.069 0.0228 0.119 0.016 0.081 0.0722 
 (0.832) (0.098) (0.569) (0.322) (0.656) (0.885) (0.583) (0.860) (0.514) (0.750) 
HotCold 0.580*** –0.019 –0.295** –0.530*** –0.115 –0.141 0.008 –0.003 –0.005 –0.0197 
 (0.0004) (0.837) (0.0367) (0.002) (0.420) (0.229) (0.976) (0.979) (0.967) (0.937) 
Ownership –0.0149** –0.009** 0.0027 0.0112 0.0106* 0.0094* 0.0252 0.00632 0.00141 0.0210 
 (0.043) (0.025) (0.674) (0.410) (0.083) (0.0872) (0.142) (0.277) (0.804) (0.233) 
Industry 0.048 0.155 0.279* –0.158 –0.194 –0.184 –0.0497 –0.0703 –0.125 0.0323 
 (0.755) (0.147) (0.099) (0.557) (0.197) (0.189) (0.858) (0.553) (0.360) (0.907) 
           
Adjusted R2 0.091 0.047 0.051 0.052 0.089 0.086 0.107 0.209 0.060 0.045 
No. of IPOs  220 220 220 220 61 61 61 61 61 61 
Multivariate regression analysis of cross-sectional variation in long-run market index-adjusted (excess) returns subsequent to listing for 281 Greek initial public offers of ordinary equity made between 
January 1993 and December 2015. Long term performance is calculated using the Fama and French (FF) three-factor model Rpt – Rft = ap + bp (Rmt – Rft) + sp SMBt + hp HMLt + ept. The dependent 
variables are: ER1Y1D - Adjusted returns from first day price to first year after going public, ER2Y1D - Adjusted returns from first day price to two years after going public, ER3Y1D - Adjusted returns 
from first day price to three years after going public, ER1Y1M - Adjusted returns from first month price to one year after going public, ER2Y1M - Adjusted returns from first month price to two years after 
going public, ER3Y1M - Adjusted returns from first month price to three years after going public. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The 
t-statistics have been corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance process. 
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Table 8: Determinants of absolute forecast error and forecast error 
 
Full sample  Size & industry matched  Industry & age matched 
Variables (1) AFE (2) FE  (3) AFE (4) FE  (5) AFE (6) FE 
Constant -11.54 4.132  -5.797 -127.855  31.635 -76.511 
 (0.653) (0.899)  (0.922) (0.187)  (0.355) (0.294) 
Size 2.765* -0.0224  3.5955 4.496  0.4603 2.450 
 (0.0838) (0.991)  (0.268) (0.389)  (0.788) (0.504) 
Age  -0.135 -0.187  -0.37043* -0.2438  -0.1200 -0.1731 
 (0.438) (0.184)  (0.074)  (0.475)  (0.410) (0.539) 
TimeLag  0.357** -0.184  0.0192 0.45254  0.39138* 0.2844 
 (0.0447) (0.412)  (0.950) (0.414)  (0.088)  (0.557) 
Privatization  0.664 -5.090  9.0905 -3.7186  2.3893 -0.2009 
 (0.937) (0.676)    (0.491) (0.872)  (0.836) (0.992) 
Underwriter -4.136 -4.541  -1.2930 13.9763  7.6324 14.199 
 (0.298) (0.365)  (0.824) (0.194)  (0.150) (0.193) 
HoltCold -13.95*** 1.096  0.69458 -1.198  -2.6554 -4.5601 
 (0.00511) (0.837)  (0.928) (0.932)  (0.585)   (0.705) 
Ownership -0.350* -0.413  -0.5459 0.93815  -0.6381*** 0.3579 
 (0.0712) (0.121)  (0.143) (0.144)  (0.002)  (0.469) 
Industry 4.698 8.562  -4.9437 -0.69873  1.716 4.8133 
 (0.342) (0.207)  (0.425) (0.953)  (0.756) (0.696) 
Mandatory 10.46** 17.89***  15.746** 34.878***  13.408** 26.123** 
 (0.0177) (0.00934)  (0.019) (0.004)    (0.016) (0.025) 
         
Adjusted R2 0.0727 0.513  0.131 0.098  0.160 0.0642 
No. of IPOs 281 281  122 122  122 122 
Multivariate regression analysis of cross–sectional variation in earnings forecast accuracy subsequent to listing for 220 Greek 
initial public offerings listed under the mandatory disclosure environment between January 1993 and December 2000 and 61 
IPOs listed in the subsequent voluntary period. Columns 1 and 2 employ the full sample; Columns 3 and 4 (Columns 5 and 6) 
match the 61 IPOs of the voluntary period with 61 from the mandatory period on the basis of proximity in assets and industry 
(industry and age). The dependent variables are absolute forecast error (AFE) and forecast error (FE). Independent variables 
are: SIZE - the logarithm of the total market capitalisation of an IPO, AGE - the number of years that each listing firm is in 
operation since its inception before the year of listing, TLAG - time lag is the period between the announcement of the 
prospectus and first day of the stocks’ listing,  PRIV - companies partially or fully owned by the Greek state before going 
public have the value‘1’ and fully private companies have the value‘0’, OVER - Oversubscription  on the  number of shares 
issued, UND - underwriters reputation: ‘1’ for reputable underwriters defined as one of the five older and more experienced 
underwriting banks  and ‘0’ for non-reputable underwriters, H/C - IPOs listed under hot market conditions have the value ‘1’ 
and IPOs listed under cold market conditions have the value ‘0’,   OWN  - proportion of given ownership by the pre-IPO 
shareholders,  IND - dummy variable taking the value of one if the company is industrial otherwise IND is zero, Mandatory - 
dummy variable taking the value of one if the IPO belongs to the mandatory disclosure period and the value of zero for IPOs 
from the voluntary period.  The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 













1993 – 2015 
ER3Y1D 
1993 – 2015 
ER1Y1M 
1993 – 2015 
ER2Y1M 
1993 – 2015 
ER3Y1M 
1993 – 2015 
ER3Y1D 
1993 – 2015 
ER3Y1M 
1993 – 2015 
ER3Y1D 
1993 – 2015 
ER3Y1M 
1993 – 2015 
Constant 1.087 –1.276 –2.832* –0.070 –2.636*** –2.748** -4.363*** -3.977*** -3.765** -3.167** 
 (0.146) (0.261) (0.011) (0.912) (0.0004) (0.0276) (0.00434) (0.00437) (0.0112) (0.0178) 
Size  –0.063 0.042 0.094 0.006 0.123*** 0.115* 0.169** 0.156** 0.149* 0.134** 
 (0.118) (0.479) (0.217) (0.852) (0.001) (0.0690) (0.0248) (0.0205) (0.0504) (0.0499) 
Age –0.003 0.003 0.002 –0.004** –0.0003 –0.002 -0.00726 -0.00551 -0.00558 -0.00420 
 (0.365) (0.493) (0.965) (0.0337) (0.880) (0.599) (0.257) (0.318) (0.384) (0.442) 
TimeLag 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.0105 0.00516 0.00947 0.00397 
 (0.226) (0.453) (0.461) (0.547) (0.389) (0.723) (0.233) (0.497) (0.291) (0.598) 
Privatization 0.526*** 0.212 0.311 0.431** 0.116 0.266 0.434 0.370 0.320 0.278 
 (0.002) (0.352) (0.589) (0.0183) (0.579) (0.640) (0.464) (0.533) (0.586) (0.641) 
Oversubscription –1.44e–05 0.0009** 0.001* –0.0004** 0.0009*** 0.001*** 0.00140** 0.00168*** 0.00134* 0.00160*** 
 (0.970) (0.021) (0.065) (0.010) (0.006) (0.0007) (0.0441) (0.00438) (0.0505) (0.00667) 
Underwriter –0.003 0.128 0.316 –0.0864 0.0718 0.115 0.476** 0.245 0.468** 0.223 
 (0.975) (0.320) (0.146) (0.222) (0.463) (0.519) (0.0363) (0.220) (0.0436) (0.277) 
HotCold 0.462*** –0.0508 –0.283* 0.0123 –0.225** –0.462*** -0.372* -0.476*** -0.368* -0.482*** 
 (0.000) (0.748) (0.167) (0.876) (0.042) (0.004) (0.0892) (0.00297) (0.0892) (0.00262) 
Ownership –0.008 –0.003 0.016 –0.005 0.001 0.016 0.0178 0.0180 0.0149 0.0161 
 (0.113) (0.586) (0.190) (0.169) (0.786) (0.135) (0.219) (0.150) (0.262) (0.152) 
Industry –0.001 0.0277 0.082 0.0956 0.0641 –0.105 0.202 -0.0207 0.170 -0.0691 
 (0.993) (0.819) (0.753) (0.255) (0.591) (0.648) (0.465) (0.932) (0.533) (0.776) 
Mandatory 0.280 0.355* 0.588** –0.0504 0.0284 0.334* 1.190*** 0.892*** 0.621** 0.267 
 (0.770) (0.086) (0.011) (0.442) (0.754) (0.070) (0.000573) (0.00797) (0.0191) (0.283) 
AFE        0.00272 0.00771   
       (0.672) (0.234)   
FE         0.00524 0.00312 
         (0.250) (0.476) 
AFE*Mandatory       -0.0139* -0.0152**   
       (0.0574) (0.0484)   
FE*Mandatory         -0.0102** -0.00478 
         (0.0439) (0.315) 
Adjusted R2 0.088 0.081 0.055 0.068 0.075 0.052  0.034 0.036 0.011 
No. of IPOs 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 281 
Multivariate regression analysis of cross-sectional variation in long-run market index-adjusted (excess) returns subsequent to listing for 281 Greek initial public offers of ordinary equity made between January 1993 
and December 2015. Long term performance is calculated using the Fama and French (FF) three-factor model Rpt - Rft = ap + bp (Rmt - Rft) + sp SMBt + hp HMLt + ept . The dependent variables ER1Y1D, Adjusted returns from 
first day price to first year after going public, ER2Y1D - Adjusted returns from first day price to two years after going public, ER3Y1D - Adjusted returns from first day price to three years after going public, ER1Y1M 
- Adjusted returns from first month price to one year after going public, ER2Y1M - Adjusted returns from first month price to two years after going public, ER3Y1M - Adjusted returns from first month price to three 
years after going public. We introduce the dummy variable ‘Mandatory’ which takes the value ‘1’ if the IPO was required to provide earnings forecast, and ‘0’ if it voluntarily provided the  forecast in the prospectus. 
AFE is the absolute forecast error and FE is the forecast error. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, t-statistics are robust for heteroskedasticity using 
the Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance process. 
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Table 10: Propensity score analysis of the relation between IPO returns and  
disclosure 
This table reports the results from the propensity score matching test where IPOs from the mandatory disclosure period of 1993-
2000 (treatment group) are compared to IPOs from the voluntary disclosure period of 2001-2015 (control group). The matching 
is attained via the methods of one-to-one nearest-neighbour (Panel A), radius with 0.1 caliper (Panel B), Kernel (Panel C) and 
stratification (Panel D). Each panel presents the total size, mean IPO returns and difference in mean IPO returns for the groups 
under comparison. The statistical significance is given by the t-statistic based on the analytical variance estimator. Both control 














Treatment group  Control group 
N           μΤ       N       μC μΤ  - μC Ho:μΤ = μC 
 
Panel A. Nearest-Neighbor (NN) matching 
ER1Y1D 220 7.25  49 -20.56 27.81 2.82 
ER2Y1D 220 -7.86  49 -49.36 41.50 3.38 
ER3Y1D 220 16.34  49 -66.42 82.76 3.94 
ER1Y1M 220 -16.41  49 -21.07 4.66 0.60 
ER2Y1M 220 -27.64  49 -37.04 9.40 0.89 
ER3Y1M 220 -8.88  49 -57.62 48.74 4.83 
 Panel B. Radius  (with 0.1 caliper)  matching 
ER1Y1D 220 7.25  51 -8.95 16.20 1.74 
ER2Y1D 220 -7.86 51 -39.75 31.89 3.04 
ER3Y1D 220 16.34 51 -45.03 61.37 3.46 
ER1Y1M 220 -16.41 51 -13.27 -3.14 -0.54 
ER2Y1M 220 -27.64 51 -34.62 6.98 0.85 
ER3Y1M 220 -8.88 51 -39.91 31.03 2.70 
 Panel C. Kernel matching 
ER1Y1D 220 7.25 51 -15.54 22.79 3.08 
ER2Y1D 220 -7.86 51 -46.51 38.65 7.47 
ER3Y1D 220 16.34 51 -53.02 69.36 2.94 
ER1Y1M 220 -16.41 51 -17.81 1.40 0.17 
ER2Y1M 220 -27.64 51 -36.74 9.10 1.01 
ER3Y1M 220 -8.88 51 -44.09 35.21 2.39 
 Panel D. Stratification matching 
ER1Y1D 220 7.25 51 -15.16 22.41 3.07 
ER2Y1D 220 -7.86 51 -45.74 37.88 4.03 
ER3Y1D 220 16.34 51 -55.22 71.56 4.23 
ER1Y1M 220 -16.41 51 -18.83 2.42 0.64 
ER2Y1M 220 -27.64 51 -34.63 6.99 0.62 







Table 11: Cross-sectional regression analysis of IPOs voluntarily providing earnings 
forecasts and IPOs without earnings forecasts  
 
The table presents results of the cross-sectional regression analysis of the earnings forecast disclosure decision and IPO long-term 
returns on various firm and IPO-specific characteristics for a sample of 83 Greek firms that went public during the voluntary 
forecast disclosure period (i.e. 2001-2015). All variables are defined in Appendix A. Regression (1) highlights the characteristics 
of companies that did not provide an earnings forecast. The dependent variable is a binary variable taking the value of ‘1’ for 
IPOs providing earnings forecasts, and ‘0’ for IPOs which select not to provide an earnings forecast. In Regressions (2-4) the 
dependent variables are: ER1Y1D - Adjusted returns from first day price to first year after going public, ER2Y1D - Adjusted 
returns from first day price to two years after going public and ER3Y1D - Adjusted returns from first day price to three years 
after going public. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 







Constant –1.782** -195.5* -202.4** -623.8*** 
 (0.013) (0.066) (0.048) (0.003) 
Size 0.0901** 13.35* 14.11** 39.89*** 
 (0.019) (0.055) (0.032) (0.002) 
Age 0.213*** -0.948** -0.513 -1.323 
 (0.0002) (0.046) (0.223) (0.258) 
TimeLag 0.00661 0.206 -0.887 0.115 
 (0.234) (0.755) (0.235) (0.946) 
Privatization –0.243 10.81 21.35 -18.08 
 (0.184) (0.619) (0.253) (0.702) 
Oversubscription 0.005*** -0.241 0.0413 -0.382 
 (0.002) (0.313) (0.909) (0.363) 
Underwriter 0.029 -33.19** -38.14*** -36.25 
 (0.751) (0.0230) (0.0056) (0.144) 
HoldCold –0.505*** -15.45 -2.958 -20.97 
 (0.0025) (0.240) (0.872) (0.356) 
Ownership 0.0120*** -0.234 -0.506 -0.880 
 (0.009) (0.699) (0.436) (0.482) 
Industry 0.048 -3.466 0.870 19.30 
 (0.665) (0.818) (0.951) (0.641) 
Vol For  13.03 -1.439 3.475 
  (0.285) (0.923) (0.869) 
     
Adjusted R2 0.484 0.073 0.101 0.124 
No. of IPOs 83 83 83 83 
